As the end of the twentieth century approaches, many areas of the world are in disarray: Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, The Congo, Eritrea, Angola, the Southern Sudan, northern Afghanistan, Chechnyia, Northern Ireland, and others. Yet the headlines of 1999 have focused on one such place: Kosovo. Half the size of Massachusetts and with a population less than half that of
the Boston CMSA, Kosovo became the center of world attention when international efforts to negotiate its political future failed and 17 NATO countries, led by the United States, mounted a bombing campaign to punish the Serbian regime that controlled it.
Justifying U.S. leadership in this action, the President of the United States, in an address to the nation, said that most Americans would probably not be able to find Kosovo on a map. But the campaign, not sanctioned by the United Nations, was warranted on grounds of principle as well as national interest: the principle was humanitarian and the national interest lay in precluding a wider war that might engulf the Balkans and Turkey. Still, the NATO bombing, refugee movements, and relief efforts engendered a vigorous national debate. Most of our college students will have been exposed to the news as the discourse, and we have an opportunity to give their thinking some geographic foundations. A number of geographic concepts relate directly to the Kosovo issue.
Supranationalism: The NATO action illustrates that supranationalism of this kind must involve the yielding of some sovereignty. Not all 17 participating NATO countries approved of every aspect of the bombing campaign, but none broke ranks to the point of abrogating it. Internal dissent was heard in every member state, but governments
put their European interests ahead of local ones. This was a highly significant development on the course toward European integration.
Globalization: Repercussions of the Kosovo action were worldwide. The NATO countries acted in unison, but they did not secure United Nations approval. Countries that had an interest in the matter, notably Russia, were marginalized. China was already opposed to the NATO campaign (some observers drew parallels between Serbia’s treatment of Kosovo and China’s actions in Xizang [Tibet]) when its embassy in Belgrade was bombed by mistake. This led to a major downturn in U.S.-Chinese relations and may have long-term consequences.
Devolution: The collapse of the former Yugoslavia now is a familiar example of the devolutionary processes affecting many states, but in the case of Kosovo it reached a new level. Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia,
Macedonia), one of which, Serbia, took on the name of Yugoslavia and still held Montenegro and Kosovo. Now further devolution, staved off in Bosnia by the Dayton Accords, is fragmenting this component further. Most, perhaps all, European governments want to avoid setting such a precedent, because most European countries are themselves multi-ethnic. That is why the issue of Kosovar independence, demanded by many leaders of the Kosovar people, is so problematic.
Domino Theory: The much-maligned domino theory holds that instability in one country may spill over into neighbors and, subsequently, the neighbors of neighbors. Although it was not identified as such, this notion is at the heart of the "national interest" philosophy that underpinned the decision to strike at the Serbian rulers of Kosovo. The Serbian regime had earlier sought to forge a "Greater Serbia" in Bosnia and Croatia; now the fear was that Serbian actions in Kosovo might ignite Muslim-Albanian reaction and draw in Greece and Turkey. These old adversaries, politically U.S. allies but often antagonistic neighbors, must be shielded from a Balkan conflict at all cost.
Ethnicity
: The term with the dreadful connotation, "ethnic cleansing," has become commonplace in the scholarly as well as the popular literature. But it was a misnomer for what happened in Croatia and Bosnia, where the better term would be "cultural cleansing." The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians are all Slavs, divided by culture rather than ancestry. In the case of Kosovo, however, "ethnic cleansing" was indeed what Serbians practiced. The Kosovars are not Slavs’ they are Illyrians who settled here in Roman times and became Islamicized during the Ottoman conquest. While the Serbs ruthlessly killed and ousted Kosovars, their government leaders could be seen on CNN denigrating the "inferior" race of "Albanians" in their midst. The Russians, in their desire to play a role in the post-bombing order in Kosovo, made no secret of their kinship with the Slavic Serbs to justify their involvement.
Cultural Tradition: As in Northern Ireland, where the "Orangemen" feel that they must parade through Catholic neighborhoods to commemorate Protestant victories centuries old, cultural memories in Yugoslavia run deep. One key justification used by the Serbians to control Kosovo was a battle fought and lost in 1389 on the so-called "Field of the Blackbirds" not far from Pristine, the capital. In truth, it was a clash between Ottoman Muslims and Orthodox Christians in which Serbs and Albanians fought on both sides. In Serbian cultural mythology this battle, and the Christian Serbians’ heroics in defeat, make this corner of Kosovo hallowed ground. When the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing began, Serbians constituted only about 9 percent of the territory’s population. But that small minority, and the churches and shrines of the Serbian Orthodox Church, made Kosovo inseparable from Serbia’s domain.
Migration: The world’s population is increasingly mobile, but the largest migration flows tend to be those of refugees. Such sudden mass movements often play a role in the destabilization of neighbors, as happened in eastern Zaire (later The Congo) recently. The impact of more than 1 million expelled Kosovars on Macedonia and Albania will long outlast the return of most of these refugees to Kosovo. In Macedonia, where between 25 and 30 percent of the population are Albanian-Muslim and the rest mainly Slavic-Christian, the refugee influx affected the delicate balance between these two groups. But the Kosovar migration flow is only the latest to emanate from devolving Yugoslavia, influencing the social geography of many countries in the realm.
Irredentism: All but forgotten in the conflict over Kosovo is a third component of "rump" Yugoslavia: the territory called Vojvodina in the north. Here lives a substantial
Hungarian minority, most of it between the Danube River and the Hungarian border. Hungary, now a NATO member, worried that its participation in the bombing campaign might lead Belgrade to act against the Hungarians in Vojvodina, but Serbia’s actions remained confined to Kosovo (and politically in Montenegro). But given what has happened to Albanians in Kosovo, the presence of Hungarians in Vojvodina has cross-border ramifications.
Relative Location: The Kosovo problem, and the attempt to force Serbia into submission, present some interesting locational issues. Like Bosnia, Kosovo is landlocked. This must be a factor in any projections of Kosovo’s future international status. Without Adriatic-facing Montenegro, Serbia would also be landlocked -- except that Serbia has a supply line, now interrupted by bombed bridges, up the Danube River from the Black Sea. Obviously Serbia has a strong interest in not allowing its Montenegro domino to fall.
The aftermath of the Kosovo campaign will affect Europe for many years into the twenty-first century. Ripple effects will be felt politically in the United Nations, economically in the United States (which will be the major donor for reconstruction), culturally in the Middle East and beyond. The Kosovo crisis is an object lesson in regional geography.
